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Abstract 
 
In social, economic and cultural situations in which the decisions of individuals are 
influenced directly by the decisions of others, there appears to be an inherently high level 
of ex ante unpredictability.  In cultural markets such as films, songs and books, well-
informed experts routinely make predictions which turn out to be incorrect. 
 
We examine the extent to which the existence of social influence may, somewhat 
paradoxically, increase the extent to which winners can be identified at a very early stage 
in the process.  Once the process of choice has begun, only a very small number of 
decisions may be necessary to give a reasonable prospect of being able to identify the 
eventual winner. 
 
We illustrate this by an analysis of the music download experiments of Salganik et.al. 
(2006). We derive a rule for early identification of the eventual winner.  Although not 
perfect, it gives considerable practical success.  We validate the rule by applying it to 
similar data not used in the process of constructing the rule. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Enormous resources are devoted to the task of predicting the outcome of social processes 
in domains such as economics, public policy, and popular culture. But these predictions 
are often woefully inaccurate. Consider, for instance, the case of cultural markets. 
Perhaps the two most striking characteristics of cultural markets, for example, are their 
simultaneous inequality, in that hit songs, books, and movies are many times more 
popular than average, and unpredictability, so that well-informed experts routinely fail to 
identify these hits beforehand (for example, Bentley et.al. 2007, De Vany 2004, 
Kretschmer et.al. 1999, Walls 2005). 
 
The very act of consumer choice in such industries is governed not just by the set of 
incentives described by conventional consumer demand theory, but by the choices of 
others (Potts et.al. 2008), so that the payoff of an individual is an explicit function of the 
actions of others.  Schelling (1973) describes an entire set of such issues as being one of 
‘binary choice with externalities’. 
 
Examination of other domains in which the events of interest are outcomes of social 
processes reveals a similar pattern – market crashes, regime collapses, fads and fashions, 
and social movements involve significant segments of society but are rarely anticipated.  
For example, the adoption of innovations (e.g., Arthur 1989, Rodgers 2003, Young 2005, 
Bettencourt et al. 2006); diffusion of criminal (e.g., Glaeser et al. 1996) and sociopolitical 
behaviors (e.g., Lohmann 1994, Nowak et al. 2000, Hedstrom et al. 2000, Colbaugh and 
Glass 2009); sales in online markets (e.g., Leskovec et al. 2006, Dhar and Chang 2007); 
trading in financial markets (e.g., Shiller 2000), and the rise and fall of fads and fashions 
(e.g., Schelling 1973, Bikhchandani et al. 1998). 
 
In the elegant experiment described in Salganik et al. 2006, researchers constructed an 
online music market and examined the role social influence played in which songs 
participants chose to download. The experiment revealed that increasing the extent to 
which participants were able to observe the selections of others – that is, the strength of 
the social influence signal – led to an increase (decrease) in the popularity of the most 
(least) popular songs and a decrease in the predictability of song popularity based on 
quality.  Other experimental studies, such as those conducted in social psychology (Asch 
1953) and experimental finance reach similar conclusions regarding the effects of social 
influence. 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which the existence of social influence 
may, somewhat paradoxically, increase the extent to which winners can be identified at a 
very early stage in the process of consumer choices in a market (Colbaugh and Glass 
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2009).  As noted above, in markets where social influence is important, ex ante prediction 
of eventual winners may be either very difficult or even impossible.  However, once the 
process of choice has begun, only a very small number of purchases may be necessary to 
give a reasonable prospect of being able to identify the eventual winners. 
 
Section 2 describes the data, section 3 sets out some initial analysis, and section 4 derives 
a prediction rule. 
 
2. The data 
 
The Salganik et.al. experiment created an artificial ‘music market’ in which  participants 
downloaded previously unknown songs either with or without knowledge of previous 
participants' choices. Increasing the strength of social influence increased both inequality 
and unpredictability of success. Success was also only partly determined by quality: The 
best songs rarely did poorly, and the worst rarely did well, but any other result was 
possible. 
 
We examined data for 18 experimental worlds, in each of which the same 48 songs were 
available for downloading.  The detailed description of the available data for each of 
these worlds is described in Salganik et.al. (op.cit.), and is publicly available from the 
Princeton University Office of Population Research data archive: 
http://opr.princeton.edu/archive/.   We briefly summarize the subset of this data used 
here. In 16 of the worlds a social signal is present.  In 8 of these worlds, the person 
making the choice of whether or not to download was given information on the previous 
number of downloads carried out by other people, with the songs sorted into popularity at 
that time. For purposes of description, we denote these experiments as being ‘strong 
positive externality process’ or strong PEP for short 
 
 In a further 8 worlds, the same information was provided, but it was not sorted into rank 
order.  For purposes of description, we denote these experiments as being ‘weak positive 
externality process’ or weak PEP for short Finally, in two of the worlds there is no social 
signal at all, designated ‘no PEP’. 
   
The total number of individual downloads in the experiments varied between 659 and 
2193. Figure 1 plots the histograms of the frequency with which each song had been 
downloaded at the end of four of the experiments, which are entirely typical of the 
experiments as a whole. 
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Figure 1 Histograms of the frequency of downloads of the 48 individual songs at 
the end of four of the experiments carried out by Salganik et.al. 2006 
 
The right-skew nature of the outcomes is immediately clear from Figure 1.  In one of 
these four illustrative experiments, even after 834 individual downloads from the total set 
of 48 songs, one song had received no downloads at all and the second lowest had just 3, 
compared to the highest which had 81.  This ratio of highest to (non-zero) lowest of 27 
reflects the inequality of the outcome, and in the other three experiments of Figure 1 this 
ratio was 19, 25.7 and 39.5. 
 
Table 1 sets out in more detail information on the final outcomes in each of the 
experiments.  Mean/median is the mean number of downloads across the 48 songs at the 
end of the experiment divided by the median.  ‘Max’ is the number of downloads of the 
‘winner’, the most frequently down loaded song, and N is the total number of downloads. 
Max/N is ‘max’ as a percentage of N.  The final column is simply the identification tags 
we assigned to each experiment, the number themselves have no analytical significance, 
they are merely for identification.  Experiments 11, 21, ...,  81 are in fact weak PEP 
worlds, 12, 22, ..., 82 are strong PEP worlds, and 91 and 92 no-PEP worlds. 
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Table 1 Various information on the distributions of the final outcomes of the 
experiments 
mean/median 
  
max         N
 
max/N experiment
1.3 57 659 8.65 11
1.77 154 1021 15.08 12
1.24 81 834 9.71 21
2.02 158 968 16.32 22
1.39 65 733 8.87 31
1.96 114 892 12.78 32
1.13 66 871 7.58 41
1.7 165 1103 14.96 42
1.21 68 755 9.01 51
1.85 161 1109 14.52 52
1.16 61 944 6.46 61
1.96 135 941 14.35 62
1.17 69 1013 6.81 71
1.77 154 1149 13.4 72
1.14 44 819 5.37 81
2.27 179 926 19.33 82
1.09 77 1571 4.9 91
1 79 2193 3.6 92
 
Notes: Mean/median is the mean number of downloads across the 48 songs at the end of 
the experiment divided by the median.  ‘Max’ is the number of downloads of the ‘winner’, 
the most frequently down loaded song, and N is the total number of downloads. Max/N is 
‘max’ as a percentage of N.  The final column is simply the identification tags we 
assigned to each experiment 
 
3. Initial evidence on predictability of outcomes 
 
Arthur (op.cit.) gives a definition of predictability of product i after n choices by 
consumers as the following:  denoting the market share of product i after n choices as in, 
it is predictable if the observer can ex ante construct a forecasting sequence {in*}with the 
property that |in - in*| → 0, with probability one, as n → ∞.   
 
Our aim in this paper is rather more heuristic.  Specifically, we examine whether a rule 
can be discovered which will enable ex ante the top ranked song at the end of each 
experiment to be identified.  In other words, we are not trying to predict the exact number 
of downloads (or market share) at the end of each experiment, but to see if the ‘winner’ 
of each experiment (i.e. the top ranked song at the end) can be identified ex ante. 
 
 5
Although this aim is less ambitious than that of predicting the final market share of the 
‘winner’, it is nevertheless one which could be of considerable value in any practical 
situation. 
 
The eventual winner in fact often emerges at a very early stage of each of the 
experiments, as the following analysis shows, of which there are two steps: 
 
First, given two vectors x and y, the Spearman rank correlation tests the null hypothesis 
that the ranks of x and y are uncorrelated.  For each of the experiments, we took steps 1 
to n and in each case carried out the Spearman test against the data at step N, the final one 
in the experiment.  So the first test in the sequence was the data at step 1 i.e. after the first 
individual download in the experiment, and the data at step N; the second the data at step 
2 and the data at step N, and so on. 
 
We identify the first step in the jth experiment– j say -  at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected at a p-value below the conventional level of significance, 0.05.  So, for example, 
with the experiment whose final outcome is plotted at the top left of Figure 1, the 
correlation between the rankings at step 1 (when there is just a single observation of a 
song with one download which therefore has the biggest rank and all the rest are ranked 
equally, having no downloads) and at step 659 is 0.058, and the null hypothesis that this 
is zero is only rejected at p = 0.69.  However, by step 10 the correlation is 0.304, and the 
null hypothesis that this is zero is rejected at p = 0.037. 
 
In no fewer than 13 out of the 18 experiments, the null hypothesis is rejected at a p-value 
< 0.05 at one of the first 10 steps of the experiment.   For the remaining 5, it is rejected at 
steps 25, 29, 34, 43 and 56.  Recall that the experiments vary in length between 659 and 
2193 steps, and it is apparent that a good approximation to the eventual rankings emerges 
at a very early stage. 
 
In the second step, we then compared the rankings at step j with the rankings at step Nj 
in each case, and examined whether the eventual winner had already emerged. 
 
In the 13 experiments where  ≤ 10 on 2 occasions, there was already an unequivocal 
leader, which at step Nj was also the ‘winner’.  In 3 additional experiments, there were 2 
joint leaders and the eventual winner was one of these; in a further 2 there were 3 joint 
leaders and the eventual winner was one of these; and in a further 2 there were 4 joint 
leaders and the eventual winner was one of these. 
 
In 9 out of these 13 experiments, then, the eventual winner was already unequivocally in 
the lead or one of a small number of the most downloaded at step j, j≤ 10. 
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For the 5 experiments where j > 10, the eventual winner was not identified at all by the 
winner(s) at step j. 
 
So although these results are mixed, they do suggest that in half of the experiments, the 
eventual winner can either be identified unequivocally or as one of a group of no more 
than 4 out of the total of 48 songs after just 10 individual downloads have taken place.  
This is approximately 1 per cent of the eventual total number. 
 
However, as a practical tool for ex ante prediction, these results do not constitute a rule at 
all, for the simple reason that the final rankings after N steps have by definition not 
emerged after n steps, n << N.  But they do suggest that in some of the experiments, early 
identification of the winner may be possible. 
 
 
4. A heuristic prediction rule 
 
A key characteristic of processes of agent choice or selection in which the decisions of 
others are taken directly into account is that the final outcome of any such process will 
typically exhibit considerable right-skew (for example, Simon 1955, Bentley et.al. 2009). 
 
An obvious way in which to proceed is to examine the data on a step-by-step basis and to 
see at what point the outcome could be regarded as exhibiting a right-skew distribution.  
In other words, to examine the distribution of the number of downloads of each of the 48 
songs after each individual download has taken place.   
 
One possibility is to carry out a formal statistical test that the data follow a hypothesised 
right skew distribution, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test or, where possible, its more 
powerful alternative the Anderson-Darling.  However, this requires that the process 
evolves to follow a known such distribution. 
 
For a Gaussian distribution, the theoretical mean of the data is equal to the theoretical 
median.  Denote by MM the ratio of the mean to the median.  Of course, in an empirical 
setting, MM may deviate from 1 even if the data are Gaussian especially in a small 
sample.  But the deviation is very unlikely to be large.  By way of example, consider a 
data set of 20 observations drawn at random from a Gaussian distribution with mean 10 
and standard deviation of 2 (this effectively rules out any non-zero numbers being 
drawn).  Over 500 replications of such a sample, the empirical MM was in the range 
0.914 to 1.122 and 95 per cent of the total (i.e. 475 ) were in the range 0.94 to 1.06. With 
a sample of 40 observations and 500 replications, the calculated MM falls in the range 
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0.936 to 1.066.  So even with small samples, the calculated MM deviates very little from 
the theoretical value of 1 if the data do indeed follow a Gaussian distribution. 
 
In contrast, in right-skew distributions, the theoretical MM is distinctly larger than 1.  For 
an exponential distribution, with rate parameter , the mean is 1/ and the median is 
log(2)/.   So the MM theoretically is 1/log(2), or around 1.44.  For a lognormal, where  
is the mean of the natural log of the variable and  is the standard deviation, the 
theoretical median is exp() and the theoretical mean exp( + 2/2), so again MM > 1 
(unless of course 2 is close to zero, when a lognormal is similar to a normal, though this 
is not the case in  these experiments).  And, obviously, for the power law, empirical 
estimates of MM will in general give a value > 1  even if the population mean does not 
exist. 
 
We therefore calculated the mean/median value at each step of each experiment (though 
in the very early stages this ratio does not exist given than the median number of 
download is zero).  We averaged this across the 8 ‘strong’ and 8 ‘weak’ positive 
externality experiments and across 2 experiments with no such externality. 
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Figure 2 Dotted line at top is average at step k of the mean/median of the 8 strong 
PEP experiments; solid line is average at step k of the mean/median of the 8 weak PEP 
experiments; broken line at bottom is average at step n of the mean/median for the 2 non-
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PEP experiments..  For n close to zero, the median is zero.  The data is plotted up to step 
659, the length of the shortest experiment. 
 
It is evident that at a fairly early stage in the process, the different types of experiment 
become differentiated using the mean/median criterion.  Note that the skew is more 
marked for the strong PEP than in an exponential distribution, where the theoretical 
mean/median is 1.44. 
The next question is therefore whether the empirical mean/median is a useful tool with 
which to make early identification of eventual ‘winners’ in the experiments. 
 
As an initial exercise, we selected the first time in each experiment that the mean/median 
> 1.10, with the next step also being above 1.10.  We compared the rankings at this step, 
 say, with the rankings in the final step, N. 
 
Specifically, we examined whether the eventual overall winner, the one with the most 
downloads at time N, can be identified in any way at time .  The most obvious thing to 
do was to see if the single highest ranked tune at step  was the same as the highest at 
time N.  This was in fact the case in 4 of the experiments, all of which were strong PEPs 
(experiments denoted 12, 52, 72 and 82 in the table below).  The next piece of 
information was whether one of the joint highest ranked at step  is the eventual winner, 
which was the case in a further 4 experiments. 
 
Table 2 sets out information on this, along with the percentage of total steps in the 
experiment which corresponds to step . 
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Table 2 Outcome of the use of the decision rule in identifying eventual winners 
 
experiment tau/N 
maximum 
single 
winner at time 
N and 
Joint winner 
at time N 
number 
of  
  download  
winner at time 
tau winner at joint   
  
at step tau 
  
time tau 
 
winners
  
11 8.04 2 no yes 6  
12 4.11 7 yes n/a n/a  
21 5.4 9 no no n/a  
22 4.75 3 no yes 4  
31 4.5 4 no no n/a  
32 5.05 4 no yes 3  
41 3.1 2 no no n/a  
42 3.63 4 no no n/a  
51 7.02 4 no yes 2  
52 4.26 8 yes n/a n/a  
61 3.5 4 no no n/a  
62 5.74 4 no yes 3  
71 3.06 3 no yes 2  
72 5.31 13 yes n/a n/a  
81 5.74 8 no no n/a  
82 5.11 8 yes n/a n/a  
91 2.42 3 no no n/a  
92 1.41 3 no no n/a  
 
Column 1 is simply a system for identifying the experiment in the database we used, and 
the numbers have no significance as such. 
 
Column 2 shows the percentage of total steps in the experiment at which the 
mean/median > 1.10 for the first time.  Column 3 shows the number of downloads of the 
market leaders at that time.  Note that in general it is very small. 
  
Column 4 indicates by yes/no whether the winner at time N at the end of the experiment 
was also the unequivocal leader at time .  Column 5 indicates by yes/no whether the 
winner at time N was one of a group of joint leaders at time , and column 6 shows the 
number of joint leaders at time .  So, for example, in experiment 11 at time , 6 songs 
each had 2 downloads and were the joint leaders, the rest having either 1 or 0.  The 
eventual winner was one of this group. 
 
In four of the experiments (12, 52, 72, and 82), the eventual winner was identified 
unequivocally at time .  Step  as a percentage of the total number of steps (individual 
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downloads) in the experiment varied between 4.11 and 5.31, and the actual number of 
downloads of the winner at time  ranged between 7 and 13. 
 
In a further five experiments (11, 22, 51, 62 and 71), the eventual winner at step N was 
one of the joint winners at step .  The number of joint winners varied between 2 and 6, 
and again  was small in comparison to the total number of steps in the experiment, 
varying between 3.06 and 8.04. 
 
In experiment 21, at step , where  is 6.4 per cent of N, the eventual winner was placed 
joint second.  In experiment 32, the eventual winner was third at step . 
 
The rule was less successful in the other experiments, but not completely without value.  
So, for example, in experiment 31 at step , the eventual winner was one of a group of 7 
which were placed joint 6th.  In experiment 42, the eventual winner was one of a group of 
11 which was joint 3rd.  In experiment 61, the eventual winner was one of a group of 8 
which was again joint 3rd. 
 
The only experiments involving a positive externality process where the eventual winner 
did not emerge, either unequivocally or as part of a small group, at an early stage were 
experiments 41 and 81, and experiments 91 and 92 where there was no direct social 
influence involved.   
 
Of the 8 experiments which exhibit strong positive externality processes, the winner at 
time N can always be identified very early, either unequivocally or as part of a small 
group, using the mean/median > 1.10 criterion.  In addition, as mean/median evolves over 
time, it rapidly becomes apparent which experiments are strong positive externality 
processes. 
 
So the simple statistic, the mean/median, appears to be a useful way of a) identifying at 
an early stage whether a process is governed in part by positive externalities in agent 
choice and b) identifying at an early stage in processes which do show evidence of 
positive externalities the choice which will eventually ‘win’ the process. 
 
We checked the validity of the MM rule with 2 further data sets from Salganik which 
were not used in the process of generating the rule.  These had older, more male, and 
more international participants that were recruited differently from those in the 
experiments used to develop the rule.  So the two provide a useful test of the rule 
 
In one of the data sets, the eventual winner was also the winner at time , when /N = 
6.17 and the maximum number of downloads for any individual track was 10.  In the 
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other, the eventual winner was ranked second at time , and the eventual second was the 
winner at time .  In this case, /N = 5.64  and the maximum number of downloads for 
any individual track was 9.  So the rule appears to provide a reasonable heuristic for early 
identification of eventual winners, especially in the presence of strong social interaction. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In markets where social influence is important in determining whether or not an agent 
decides to adopt a particular mode of behavior or buy a particular product or brand, a 
large literature shows that successful ex ante prediction of the eventual winner is either 
very difficult or impossible. 
 
However, the existence of social influence means that it is often possible to identify the 
eventual winner at a very early stage of the process of choice by participants in the 
market.  Even if the winner cannot be identified exactly, a set from which this winner 
does emerge and which contains a small percentage of the total number of choices 
available can often be identified. 
 
We illustrate this with an analysis of the artificial cultural market created by Salganik 
et.al (op.cit.).  We derive a rule for early identification of the eventual winner, which we 
verify by using it successfully on two further experiments which were not part of the data 
sets used to create the rule. 
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